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Is Brown the New Black?:1  American Muslims, 
Inherent Propensity for Violence,2 and 
America’s Racial History 
Amara S. Chaudhry-Kravitz3 
                                                                                                     
 1. The title of this article, borrowed from the world of women’s fashion, may at first 
seem to trivialize a complex, multi-faceted topic of sociological, legal, and political 
significance.  The author chose this title for stylistic reasons—though her thesis would 
arguably have been more effectively articulated if the title was:  “Is ‘Brown’ Actually a New 
Shade of ‘Black’?”  To clarify the use of color words in the title, the term “brown” is a short-
hand expression commonly used by Muslims of varied racial and ethnic backgrounds and 
divergent physical characteristics when referring to the equally diverse and pluralistic 
American Muslim community.  The term “black” in the title is a shorthand expression 
frequently used by Americans of culturally diverse backgrounds to refer to African 
Americans.  In using this term, the author is fully aware that African Americans occupy a 
unique position in American society as a result of a very particular cultural history and a 
shared contemporary experience of the present-day legacy of that history.  As stated below, 
the author’s thesis rests upon her assertion that America’s racial history is largely dependent 
upon a socially constructed white/non-white binary in which persons defined as “non-white” 
are presumed to have an inherent propensity for violence.  The author’s choice of tile derives 
from the fact that the primary example of this racial binary in American culture, and the 
presumptions of violence which apply thereto, in the United States is the black/white binary.  
Though “brown” may not be “the new black,” the author asserts that “brown” is certainly a 
shade of “non-white” and that it would be helpful for American society to dialogue about the 
similarities and differences between these distinctions. 
 2. This article asserts that American Muslims are perceived as having an inherent 
propensity for violence and theorizes that this perception is related to an American racial 
history, which has a long history of perceiving “non-white” persons in this manner.  It is this 
perceived inherent propensity for violence that is referenced in the title for this article, 
though the word “perceived” has been omitted for stylistic reasons. 
 3. Amara Chaudhry-Kravitz currently serves as legal director for the Council on 
American-Islamic Relations Philadelphia Office (CAIR-Philadelphia).  This article is her 
second scholarly publication on the issue of legal definitions of race, the imposition of legal 
racial classification categories, and the presumptions of violence that drive those definitions.  
Her first article, “Lessons from Jim Crow: What Those Seeking Self-Determination for 
Transgender Individuals Can Learn from American’s History with Racial Classification 
Categories” was published during her years of service as legal director for an LGBT civil 
rights practice, which immediately preceded her current position.  See Amara S. Chaudhry, 
Lessons from Jim Crow: What Those Seeking Self-Determination for Transgender 
Individuals Can Learn from American’s History with Racial Classification Categories, 18 
TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 505 (2009). 
  Ms. Chaudhry-Kravitz’s primary research interest focuses upon the ways in which 
the American construction of “race” affects the extent to which American Muslim identity is 
associated with a presumed inherent propensity for violence and criminal behavior.  At 
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I.  Introduction 
Good morning everybody.4  So as I was preparing to come here today,5 
and I looked at the topic of “Where We Are, Where We’ve Been, Where 
                                                                                                     
CAIR-Philadelphia, she focuses her legal work on cases that involve this association and 
legal consequences of this association mostly in the context of national security and criminal 
justice. 
  Prior to her career as a “civil rights” attorney, Ms. Chaudhry-Kravitz devoted the 
majority of her career to the field of criminal justice.  Immediately following her graduation 
from Washington & Lee University School of Law, she worked for many years as an 
assistant public defender and private criminal defense attorney in both West Virginia and 
Pennsylvania.  She has represented both juveniles and adults in state and federal court at 
every level of proceeding, including jury trials and state and federal appellate work.  She 
also worked in the criminal justice field while an undergraduate at the University of Virginia 
through internships with juvenile probation departments and a juvenile court-ordered 
diversion program. 
  It is Ms. Chaudhry-Kravitz’s years working in the criminal justice field, and her 
significant research into the historical legal construct of race, which prompted her to write 
this article about race-based presumptions of violence. 
 4. This article stems from my remarks during a symposium at Washington & Lee 
University School of Law.  To capture the essence of those remarks, this article contains 
language commonly associated with oral, rather than written, communication.  I hope the 
reader enjoys that stylistic device. 
 5. See supra note 4. 
IS BROWN THE NEW BLACK? 5 
We’re Going,”6 I decided that topic was too broad for me to discuss in 
fifteen to twenty minutes, and I needed to narrow it a little bit for the 
purpose of my remarks. 
In an effort to narrow this topic, I will focus specifically on the 
increasing criminalization7 of American Muslim identity post-9/118 and the 
extent to which that criminalization is affected by a racial element or a 
racial component.  However, to remain true to the structure implied by this 
panel’s title, I will structure my discussion within the “Where We Are, 
Where We’ve Been, Where We’re Going” framework.  For the “Where We 
Are” discussion, I will demonstrate how American Muslim identity has 
been “criminalized” post-9/11.  I’ll then segue into the “Where We’ve Been 
Discussion” in which I will analyze the criminalization of American 
Muslim identity within the larger framework of America’s racial history.  
Finally, in the “Where We’re Going” discussion, I will posit to you that 
understanding the racial underpinnings of anti-Muslim bias in the United 
States is necessary in order to effectively advocate for American Muslim 
legal equality. 
Throughout my remarks, my thesis is simple.  I assert that the 
criminalization of American Muslim group identity is a by-product of two 
things: (1) the historical racialization of that identity as a “non-white” racial 
category, and (2) the presumption, throughout American history, that “non-
white” persons have an inherent propensity for violence and criminality. 
II.  Defining Our Terms 
Before I delve too deeply into the substance of my remarks, I want to 
take a moment to define my terms. 
Throughout my remarks, I will use the phrase “American Muslim.”  
When I use this term, I am referring to persons living in the United States 
who either self-identify as “Muslim,” or who are identified by others as 
“Muslim” regardless of whether the basis of that identity lies in internal 
religious beliefs, externally articulated religious beliefs, and/or externally 
                                                                                                     
 6. This was the title of the first panel presentation at Washington & Lee University 
School of Law’s Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice’s 2013 Symposium.  See 
Symposium, Discrimination Against Muslim Americans in a Post-9/11 World, 20 WASH. & 
LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST.  (2013). 
 7. The term “criminalization,” as it is used in this article, is described in Part II, 
below. 
 8. Throughout this article, the term “9/11” will be used as a shorthand expression 
referring to the tragic attacks on our nation that occurred on September 11, 2001. 
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expressed religious practices.  The term “Muslim” shall apply to any such 
identified persons regardless of race, ethnicity, national origin, or country 
of familial origin.  The term also applies irrespective of an individual’s 
country of citizenship, whether a person is an immigrant or American born, 
and regardless of the duration of the individual’s, or the individual’s 
family’s, history in the United States. 
When I speak about “criminalization,” I’m speaking about explicit, 
implicit, or even unconscious use of Muslim identity as either an ex ante9 
basis for predicting an individual’s propensity for violence or likelihood to 
engage in criminal behavior10 in the future, or as an ex post facto11 basis for 
determining the likelihood that an individual has engaged in violence and/or 
criminal behavior in the past or present.12 
                                                                                                     
 9. Ex ante is a Latin phrase meaning “before the event.” 
 10.  The “criminal behavior” to which I am referring includes, but is not limited to, the 
terrorism crimes outlined in Title 18, Chapter 113B, of the United States Code, though there 
is an ongoing debate as to whether the federal criminal justice system is the appropriate 
forum to address “terrorism” and “terroristic acts” and whether “terrorism” should be 
considered as a “criminal act” or an “act of war.”  While I acknowledge the validity of that 
debate, the debate itself is largely beyond the scope of this article.  Instead, this article 
focuses only upon an explicit or implied presumption of an inherent propensity for violence, 
and the term “criminalization” is being used as a short-hand express for that presumption. 
 11. Ex post facto is a Latin phrase meaning “after the event.”  Though this phrase is 
most commonly used to describe a law that retroactively criminalizes previously 
noncriminal actions, this article uses the term in a more literal context. 
 12. My definition of the term “criminalization” was somewhat inspired by language 
used by William M. Carter, Jr., to describe “racial profiling.”  See A Thirteenth Amendment 
Framework for Combating Racial Profiling, 39 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 17 (Winter, 2004) 
(“Racial profiling, or the use of race as an ex ante basis for criminal suspicion.”).  At Note 
21, Dean Carter acknowledges that “racial profiling” may apply to other societal groups 
other than African Americans, but, as his article discusses racial profiling as an “incident [ ] 
or badge [ ] of slavery” under the Thirteenth Amendment; he does not attempt to analyze the 
extent to which “racial profiling” applies to other societal groups. 
  There is a reason why I avoided the term “racial profiling” in this article.  The 
term “racial profiling,” by its own terms, applies only to “profiling” based upon “race.”  As 
discussed in Part V of this article, many civil rights advocates, both internal and external to 
the American Muslim community, have used the term “racial profiling” to describe the 
practice of using American Muslim identity as an ex ante basis for criminal suspicion.  
While the use of the term “profiling” in this way seems to coincide with Dean Carter’s 
definition of “racial profiling,” one question remains:  Is profiling on the basis of “Muslim” 
identity a form of profiling on the basis of a “racial” identity?  This is the central question 
posed by this article.  As the classification of “Muslim” identity as a “racial” identity is the 
central issue being examined herein, I thought it inappropriate to use the term “racial 
profiling” (which seemingly concludes, without examination, that “Muslim” identity has 
been socially construed as a “racial” identity).   
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When I speak of the “racialization,” I am referring to the extent to 
which American Muslim identity is construed, and has been historically 
construed, as a racial category.  As I describe below in Part III, below, I 
believe that it is undisputed that American Muslims have a socially 
constructed group identity, and this group identity has been criminalized.  
The question, which is examined by this article, is whether that socially 
constructed group identity is, and should be understood as, a racial identity.  
In answering this question, I will argue that American Muslim should be 
construed as a racial identity, I will describe how Muslim identity has been 
socially constructed as a “non-white” racial identity13 in a nation which has 
a long history of assuming that persons who belong to populations 
consisting mostly of individuals with black or brown skin have a higher 
propensity for violence and criminality.14  Therefore, considering American 
Muslim identity in the context of American racial history and the historical 
                                                                                                     
 13. I am not the first writer to comment upon the “racialization” of “Muslim” identity.  
However, I want to clarify my position on this topic in relation to other authors. 
  Some scholars, particularly those in the field of Asian critical race studies, have 
referred to this racialization process as similar to, and perhaps a continuation of, the historic 
“otherization” or “alienation” of Asian American identity, in which persons belonging to 
that socially constructed racial group are seen as “perpetual others” or “perpetual foreigners” 
in American society.  These theories of the “otherization” or “alienation” of American 
Muslim identity assume that “Muslims,” as a racial category, are external to the classic 
black/white racial binary which has historically defined American society, including those 
Muslims who, but for their Muslim identity, would otherwise be defined racially as either 
“black” or “white.” 
  This article does not discuss the “racialization” of American Muslim identity in 
quite the same way.  Instead, I adopt an approach more similar to that taken by Ian Haney 
Lopez.  In so doing, I would argue that  Haney suggests a white/non-white racial binary 
which is similar to the black/white racial binary most commonly discussed in the field of 
critical race studies and the legal construction of race.  See generally IAN HANEY LOPEZ, 
WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (1996) (positing that a white racial 
identity has been significant in American history and that the social and legal position of 
persons of non-white racial identities results from their exclusion from the socially desirable 
white racial group). 
  Borrowing from Haney’s white/non-white dichotomy, this article suggests that 
American Muslims have been “racialized” within, and not external to, America’s traditional 
racial binaries.  Furthermore, I assert that American Muslim identity has been “criminalized” 
precisely because American Muslims are being socially construed as belonging to a racial 
category which has long been perceived as having an inherent propensity for violence and 
criminality. 
 14. See Carter, supra note 12, at 56–60 (discussing the extent to which non-white 
racial identity is associated with an inherent propensity for violence and criminality and 
documenting the extent to which this criminalization process has applied to other racial 
groups); see also Chaudhry, supra note 3, at 506–07 (describing the history of 
criminalization of the African American racial identity).  
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criminalization of non-white racial identity, I argue that American Muslims 
have been criminalized on the basis of their group identity precisely 
because their group identity has been racialized as a “non-white” racial 
identity. 
In order to understand the concept I label as “racialization,” it is 
necessary to distinguish between anti-Muslim bias (specifically, the 
criminalization of American Muslim identity), which is, in effect, a 
racialized bias, and anti-Muslim bias, which is a religious bias.  When I 
refer to a racialized bias, I refer to a belief (possibly, unstated or even 
unconscious) that American Muslims have an inherent propensity for 
violence as an intrinsic and organic part of their very being.  This 
propensity is inborn, immutable, and cannot be removed by converting to 
another religious faith or otherwise altering one’s religious beliefs or 
practices.  This racialized bias against American Muslims should be 
understood to be separate and distinct from a belief (which, again, may be 
unstated or even unconscious) that Muslims’ belief system encourages 
violence and that a Muslim can be “cured,” as it were, from his propensity 
for violence by converting to another faith or otherwise altering his 
religious beliefs.15  As one scholar phrases it, “In a religious conflict, it is 
not who you are but what you believe that is important.  Under a racist 
regime, there is no escape from who you are…or are perceived to be.”16 
III.  Where We Are: Post-9/11 Criminalization of American Muslim Identity 
A.  In a Post-9/11 World, American Muslim Identity Has Been Criminalized 
So, beginning by speaking about where we are now, I’m going to 
assert an almost indisputable fact—that American Muslim identity has been 
criminalized post-9/11. In other words, American Muslims have been 
socially constructed to have a shared group identity, and persons associated 
with that socially constructed group identity are presumed to have an 
inherent inclination toward violent behavior.  As described below, I assert 
that there have been a multitude of post-9/11 governmental policies enacted 
                                                                                                     
 15. See infra Part IV, for an analysis of this concept as applied to another, non-
Muslim, people with a socially constructed group identity that contains both religious and 
racial components. 
 16. Moustafa Bayoumi, Racing Religion, in AMERICAN STUDIES: AN ANTHOLOGY 99, 
103 (Janice A. Radway, Kevin Gaines, Barry Shank & Penny Von Eschen eds., 2009). 
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post-9/11 which appear to be premised upon this presumption of 
criminality.17 
We see examples of this apparent presumption of criminality 
everywhere. We begin with FBI surveillance of mosques.18  We have also 
seen federal prosecutorial targeting of religious and civic organizations, 
such as CAIR19 and other national organizations, including Islamic 
                                                                                                     
 17. The term “presumption of criminality” shall be understood herein to refer to a 
presumption of criminal suspicion.  See Carter, supra note 12, at 40 (discussing the use of 
racial factors by police as a means by which to focus their search for a criminal suspect). 
 18. Both the American Civil Liberties Union of Southern California (ACLU-So. Cal.) 
and the Council on American-Islamic Relations of Greater Los Angeles (CAIR-LA) have 
heavily documented FBI surveillance of mosques and Islamic centers.  See GREATER LOS 
ANGELES AREA CHAPTER, COUNCIL ON AMERICAN-ISLAMIC RELATIONS (2009) available at 
http://ca.cair.com/download.php?f=/downloads/CAIR_FBI_Abuses_Annotated_Source_List
--Articles_and_Cases.pdf. 
  In February 2011, the ACLU-So. Cal. and CAIR-LA filed a lawsuit against the 
FBI alleging that FBI actions—specifically, using undercover agents to enter mosques to 
collect personal information, and information about “constitutionally protected” religious 
practices—violated the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment, as 
well as other provisions of the United States Constitution.  See Fazaga v. F.B.I, 884 F. Supp. 
2d 1022 (C.D. Ca. 2012). 
 19. See United States v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev., CRIM.A.3:04-CR-240-
G, 2007 WL 1498813 (N.D. Tex. 2007). The Council on American-Islamic Relations, a 
nationwide non-profit civil rights organization for which the author of this article works, is 
known by the acronym “CAIR.”  On May 29, 2007, the United States Attorney’s Office for 
the Northern District of Texas filed, in a criminal containing a sealed indictment, a document 
titled “Government’s Trial Brief” which included an “Attachment A” which listed the names 
of numerous American Muslim organizations, including CAIR and 245 others as “co-
conspirators” in a case in which they were never indicted.  See The Investigative Project on 
Terrorism, http://www.investigativeproject; see also The Investigative Project on Terrorism: 
Attachment A org/documents/case_docs/423.pdf.  Because the persons and organizations 
named on this list were never formally indicted, they became known simply as “unindicted 
co-conspirators” (or, “UCC,” as a short-hand reference).  Due to political pressure  (in which 
media attention was used to apply this pressure), Attorney General Eric Holder was asked to 
review the Holy Land Foundation case file to see if there was sufficient legal or factual basis 
to seek an indictment against these alleged “co-conspirators.”  Notably, Mr. Holder’s 
predecessors in President Bush’s Justice Department had initially considered seeking such 
indictments but ultimately decided otherwise. See Bush Justice Department Nixed CAIR 
Indictment in 2004, POLITICO.COM, http://www.politico.com//blogs/joshgerstein/0411/Source 
_Bush_Justice_Department_nixed_CAIR_indictment_in_2004.html. Attorney General 
Holder agreed to such a review and released a public statement indicating that, “looking at 
the facts and law,” the Justice Department under his direction would not reverse the decision 
of the previous administration. Holder DOJ Nixed CAIR Leaders Prosecution, 
POLITICO.COM, http://www.politico.com//blogs/joshgerstein/0411/Holder_DOJ_nixed_CAIR 
_leaders_prosecution.html.  On July 1, 2009, a district court judge in northern Texas 
officially sealed both the “Government’s Trial Brief” and its “Attachment A” because 
“[n]either CAIR nor the other unindicted co-conspirators have been charged with a crime 
and they have [had] no judicial forum in which to defend against the accusation.”  Criminal 
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charities.20  But the federal government is not the only one keeping its eye 
on the Muslim community.  For example, we know that the NYPD has 
conducted surveillance from Pennsylvania to Connecticut, and specifically 
it has targeted both mosques and Muslim student associations at 
universities.21  We see the criminalization of American Muslim identity at 
airports when DHS and TSA employees target “Muslim-looking” 
individuals, or individuals with “Muslim-sounding” names for secondary 
screenings based upon an unspoken presumption that American Muslims 
have an inherent propensity to engage in acts of violence against the United 
                                                                                                     
Case No. 3:04-cr-00240-P, Docket Entry No. 1356, at p.10 of 20  (N.D. Tex.)  (publicly 
available at: http://www.scribd.com/doc/43380629/2009-order-on-Holy-Land-Foundation-
unindicted-coconspirator-list).  The court further noted that “the release of the List subjected 
CAIR to annoyance, ridicule, scorn, and loss of reputation in the community” and that the 
Government had a multitude of options available to it that it did not release the list out of 
necessity.  Id. at pp. 10–11 of 20.  Later, in 2010, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit ruled in favor of an un-indicted co-conspirator who had filed a civil rights lawsuit 
against the Department of Justice.  In ruling against the DOJ, the court found that the public 
release of the names of these so-called “unindicted co-conspirators” resulted in a violation of 
the named parties’ due process rights (i.e., an opportunity to defend themselves against 
allegations of criminal impropriety). 
 20. See id.; see also Steve C. Posner, Posner on United States v. Holy Land 
Foundation for Relief and Development, 2008 EMERGING ISSUES 891 (2007); Holy Land 
Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
 21. See Highlights of AP's Pulitzer Prize-winning probe into NYPD intelligence 
operations, AP.ORG http://www.ap.org/media-center/nypd/investigation (last visited Nov. 
27, 2013). 
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States or its citizens.22  We have also seen anti-Muslim trainings by law 
enforcement23 in the United States military.24 
B.  Is This Criminalization a Result of a “Racialization” of American 
Muslim Identity? 
So now let’s analyze some of the possible explanations for the 
criminalization I just described. Okay, so if American Muslims have a 
socially constructed group identity, and are presumed to have a propensity 
for violence and criminal behavior on the basis of that group identity, why 
does this presumption exist?  What, specifically, about that group identity 
leads to the presumption of criminality?  And, as I suggest, is this 
presumption predicated upon a socially constructed definition of “race,” or 
is it predicated upon something else?  Well let’s think critically about some 
of the contemporary examples of this criminalization, described in Subpart 
                                                                                                     
 22. “Muslim profiling” at airports is one of the most commonly discussed examples of 
what I define here as the increasing criminalization of American Muslim identity.  However, 
it is unclear how widespread this phenomenon truly is.  Intake data from “the nation’s largest 
Muslim civil rights organization,” the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) 
shows that only 1 percent of its intake calls are comprised of persons who seek CAIR’s legal 
assistance due to perceived “Muslim profiling” at airports.  Though intake data can be 
affected by a multitude of factors, this data has remained constant for several years and 
consistent, as an average, across CAIR chapters nationwide.  See COUNCIL ON AMERICAN-
ISLAMIC RELATIONS, THE STATUS OF MUSLIM CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 2009: 
SEEKING FULL INCLUSION, 11 (2009), available at https://www.cair.com/images/pdf/CAIR-
2009-Civil-Rights-Report.pdf (reporting that 2.71 percent of civil rights cases involving 
Muslim-Americans arose from incidents that occurred in airports). 
  Despite this author’s uncertainty regarding the prevalence of this practice, the 
existence and prevalence of “airport profiling” of American Muslims has become a mainstay 
of scholarship discussing the civil rights of Americans in the post-9/11 era.  See Leti Volpp, 
The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1575, 1580 and nn. 13–14 (2002) 
(examining the legitimacy of racial profiling and the relationship between citizenship, nation 
and identity). 
 23. See SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER INTELLIGENCE REPORT, FBI Used Training 
Materials from Anti-Muslim Extremists, Issue No. 144 (2011), available at 
http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/intelligence-report/browse-all-issues/2011/winter/fbi-
used-training-materials-from-anti; see also Muslim Public Affairs Counsel, Enough is 
Enough: The anti-Muslim Training Tide Must Turn, (May 18, 2012) available at 
http://www.mpac.org/programs/government-relations/dc-news-and-views/enough-is-
enough-the-anti-muslim-training-tide-must-turn.php (providing a more extensive discussion 
of anti-Muslim training materials used by the United States military, the Department of 
Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the New York Police Department).  
 24. See Spencer Ackerman, FBI Teaches Agents: ‘Mainstream’ Muslims are ‘Violent, 
Radical’, WIRED.COM (Sept. 14, 2011), available at http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/ 
2011/09/fbi-muslims-radical/all/1 (documenting the anti-Muslim training materials by the 
United States military). 
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A above, and let’s think about whether these examples of criminalization 
appear to be motivated by “race” or by some other factor. 
When we speak about profiling at airports and borders, we are 
normally talking about individuals who are stopped, pulled aside, maybe 
even subjected to additional questioning or screening simply because of 
things such as their name or their physical appearance (i.e., the so-called 
“Muslim looking” people).25  In that case, well, it sure looks like a 
racialized practice, right? 
For example, let’s say you go to an airport and your name is something 
along the lines of “Abdul Hakim Mohammed Jamal.”  Well, now, despite 
your name, it’s entirely possible that you never were a Muslim, or that you 
were formerly a Muslim but you converted to a non-Muslim faith well in 
advance of going to the airport on that date.  However, if your name is still 
Abdul Hakim Mohammed Jamal, and/or you look like a guy who could be 
named Abdul Hakim Mohammed Jamal, well then you know to get to the 
airport early because you anticipate difficulty getting through security.  
Right? That’s what I’m saying. . . . I’m just saying, you know, that that’s 
still a situation.26  And I know this from experience.  I had a client, a 
gentleman who was stopped at the US–Canadian border, and the sole 
questions the Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) asked him were “You—
what’s your name?”  Now, I can’t remember if his name was Muhammad 
Jamaal or Jamaal Muhammad, but let’s just say he looked like a guy who 
could have one of those names—so he was asked that particular question 
which led to a completely predictable follow-up question.  The client gave 
his name, and he was asked, “Where are you from?”  Of course, he said 
“Norristown, PA” which completely agitated the CBP agent who 
responded, “You know what I mean—where are you from originally.”  The 
client disclosed his country of national origin, a well-known Muslim-
majority nation,27 and all he heard was “Okay, come over here” before he 
was handcuffed and detained just shy of forty-eight hours (and people who 
practice criminal law know that forty-eight hours used to mean something 
in that context).  Another client of mine had the exact same experience—
even though the nation he disclosed was his family’s country of origin, and 
he was a native-born American citizen. 
                                                                                                     
 25. See Muneer Ahmad, A Rage Shared by Law: Post-September 11 Racial Violence 
as Crimes of Passion, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1259, 1261 (2004) (arguing that a new post-9/11 
racial identity has formed which includes all “Muslim-looking” people). 
 26. See supra notes 4–5. 
 27. A nation generally known to the American population as having a large Muslim 
majority population. 
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In situations such as the one we just described, we’re looking at 
discrimination on the basis of what we call immutable characteristics.  My 
client was singled out for a certain line of questioning—one which would 
predictably disclose information which would later be used to deprive him 
of his liberty—based upon characteristics he could not change.  He could 
not change the physical appearance, which prompted the initial questioning.  
He also could not do anything to alter the location of his birth, and 
truthfully disclosing that information caused suspicion that he might 
possess a criminal intent (or has already engaged in criminal behavior) and 
resulted detention.  So situations such as the one I just described appear to 
criminalize Muslim identity on the basis of national origin, race, or 
ethnicity—all of which are immutable characteristics. 
Even presumptions which, at first, appear to be based on non-racial 
factors, can, in fact, be motivated by social constructs of “race.”  For 
example, last night, as I was looking over some anti-Muslim training 
materials used by the United States military,28 I noticed something that I 
had not previously seen before.  Now, most anti-Muslim training materials, 
whether coming from the military or law enforcement, focus almost entirely 
upon religious beliefs and practices, and these slides were no different.  
However, I was struck by the constant reference to “moderate” (in quotes) 
Muslims in these Power Point slides.  Actually, every mention of 
“moderate” Muslims contained the word “moderate” in quotation marks, as 
if to suggest that “moderate” Muslims (however the term “moderate” be 
defined) do not exist.  The slides continue to expand upon this point, 
indicating that all persons with a Muslim identity share an inherent 
sympathy for terrorism committed in the name of Islam, regardless of that 
person’s religious practices or expressed religious beliefs.29  If, as these 
slides suggest, a Muslim’s propensity of violence is not dependent upon his 
religious beliefs or practices, then what is this inherent propensity 
dependent upon?  What aspect of his “Muslim” identity is the relevant 
factor?  I would suggest the individual’s association with the Muslim 
“race”—in other words, the racialization of his Muslim identity—that is the 
basis for presuming his inherent propensity for violence. 
However, it is not always that simple.  In some situations, the 
presumptions of criminality associated with American Muslim identity 
                                                                                                     
 28. See Lt. Col. Matthew A. Dooley, Power Point Presentation: “So What Can We 
Do?” A Counter-Jihad Op Design Model, 23 (2011), available at http://www.wired.com/ 
images_blogs/dangerroom/2012/05/dooley_counter_jihad_op_design_v11.pdf (last visited 
Oct. 5, 2013). 
 29. Id. at 28. 
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appear to be based, at least in part, upon completely mutable characteristics 
such as religious beliefs or religious behavior.  However, even in those 
situations, the initial interest in the individual is, most often, still reliant 
upon a racialized presumption that all Muslims have an inherent propensity 
for violence.  Let’s take, for example, the FBI’s surveillance of mosque 
attendees.30  In my own legal practice, I have seen the FBI take a particular 
interest in American Muslims who publicly engage in certain religious 
practices commonly associated with the devout.  For example, the FBI has 
specifically targeted American Muslims who have been observed as 
frequent mosque attendees, those who engage in proselytizing of the faith, 
and those who regularly attend community meetings to discuss the faith.  
Furthermore, when American Muslims have agreed to be interviewed by 
the FBI in a “national security” matter, they almost always are questioned 
about their specific religious beliefs and practices.  They are asked about 
whether they pray at home, whether they pray five times a day, and whether 
they fast during Ramadan.  In this scenario, the racialized Muslim identity 
still targets American Muslims for close scrutiny, but now there is no 
longer a presumption of an inherent propensity for violence and criminality.  
Instead, the determination as to whether someone has a propensity for 
violence and criminality is based upon that person’s beliefs or behaviors. 
IV.  Where We’ve Been: Legal Constructs, and Consequences, of Race in 
America and the Historical Racialization of American Muslim Identity31 
So we know that this is where we are now: American Muslims have 
been “criminalized,” and it appears as though the underlying predicate of 
that criminalization rests both in some sort of socially constructed 
“racialized” American Muslim group identity and on the basis of wholly 
mutable characteristics such as individualized beliefs and behavior. 
Now, I want to step back a minute to discuss “Where We’ve Been.”  
If, as I suggest, the criminalization of American Muslim identity post-9/11 
is based, at least to some extent, upon socially constructed notions of 
                                                                                                     
 30. Bayoumi, supra note 16. 
 31. As detailed in the notes contained in this article, my research into the relevant case 
law on this issue owes a huge debt to Moustafa Bayoumi’s seminal article documenting the 
extent to which American Muslim identity was legally construed as a non-white racial 
identity and the legal consequences of these judicial determinations regarding the “race” of 
“American Muslims” (as I have defined those persons in Part II, above).  To be candid, 
almost all scholars who have written about the “racialization” of American Muslim identity 
owe a huge debt to Professor Bayoumi’s detailed and deliberate research. 
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“race,” then there are new questions to discuss.  First, can a religious 
identity be “racialized,” or are racial and religious identities two separate 
social constructs?  Second, if religious identity can be “racialized,” what is 
the evidence that American Muslim identity has been “racialized?” 
I will answer these questions concurrently, beginning with cases that 
demonstrate that American Muslim identity, a seemingly religious identity, 
has been historically construed as a non-white racial identity as a matter of 
law.  The very existence of this body of case law, and the language 
contained therein, is evidence that a religious identity can be “racialized” 
and, by way of an example, that Muslim religious identity has been so 
racialized. 
The greatest evidence of this racialization of American Muslims as 
“non-white” is contained in cases which are known as the “racial 
prerequisite cases.”  These are cases that were decided during the time 
period beginning in 1790 and ending in 1952 in which the Naturalization 
Act limited American citizenship to what was called “free white persons,”32 
but without defining exactly who would be included in this particular racial 
category.  The Act was later broadened in 1870 to include persons of 
“African nativity” and persons of “African descent”33 and again in 1940 to 
include “races indigenous to the Western Hemisphere.”34  During this time 
period, any persons who immigrated to the United States who did not 
qualify as either a “free white person,” a person belonging to a race 
“indigenous to the Western Hemisphere,” or a person of “African nativity” 
or “African descent” could lawfully enter the United States but could not be 
naturalized as a citizen of the United States.35  In the racial prerequisite 
                                                                                                     
 32. See Bayoumi, supra note 16, at 99.  Bayoumi’s article is considered to be the 
seminal publication on the topic of the racialization of the Islamic faith.  It has been 
reprinted in numerous publications.  For the purposes of this article, the author will cite to 
page numbers as they appear in the volume of American Studies upon which she principally 
relied while preparing this article for publication. 
 33. See Naturalization Act of 1870, 16 Stat. 254, 256 (1870). 
 34. See Naturalization Act of 1940, Pub. L No. 853, 54 Stat. 1137, 1140 (1940). 
 35. As a historical point, I want to mention the Immigration Act of 1917, which 
created what it called the “Asiatic Barred Zone” (and is consequently also known as the 
“Asian Barred Zone” Act), which barred immigration from the continent of Asia and “[a]ny 
country not owned by the U.S. adjacent to the continent of Asia.”  Pub. L. No. 301, 39 Stat. 
874, 881 (1917).  Presumably, this new Act would have had a profound effect upon 
immigration from the Muslim-majority world (much of which is located within the continent 
of Asia or adjacent thereto).  As a matter of law, any person who sought to immigrate to the 
United States from a nation located within the barred zone would not merely be deprived of 
the possibility of becoming a naturalized citizen, he would also be banned from any lawful 
entry into the United States.  Despite this historical point, however, this article discusses a 
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cases, an immigrant filed an application for citizenship and a federal court, 
when considering whether to grant that decision, was faced with the 
question of deciding whether the immigrant could lawfully claim to be 
“free white persons” and, therefore, eligible to become a citizen under the 
Naturalization Act. 
Specifically, I want to discuss some racial prerequisite cases, which 
involve petitioners from the Muslim-majority world, or other nations within 
the Greater Middle East.  The purpose of this discussion is to demonstrate 
the extent to which religious identity or affiliation was historically used, in 
the context of the racial prerequisite cases, by federal courts to make a legal 
determination as to race. 
The first case I want to talk about is In re Hassan, which arose out of 
the Eastern District of Michigan in 1942.36  In that case, a Yemeni Muslim 
man was petitioning a federal district court to be naturalized as a citizen of 
the United States.37  As he petitioned the court, Mr. Hassan employed a 
tactic which was common among petitioners in the racial prerequisite 
cases38—he asserted that he was a member of the “white race” due to the 
fact that he belonged to an ethnic group which “are remote descendants of 
and therefore members of the Caucasian or white race. . . .”39  Mr. Hassan 
also seemed to assume that his physical appearance—which, as the court 
noted in its decision, included an “extremely dark complexion”40—would 
pose an obstacle to his ability to claim to be a member of the “white” race 
because he came to court “armed with affidavits”41 stating that his coloring 
‘is typical of the majority of Arabians [sic] from the region from which he 
                                                                                                     
number of racial prerequisite cases, which were decided during the time period when the 
Asiatic Barred Zone Act was in effect.  Each of the cases cited and discussed herein involve 
petitions for naturalization (and not removal or deportation proceedings).  Due to the 
procedural posture of these cases, and the legal issues contained therein, it can be concluded 
that the petitioners in each of these cases entered the United States lawfully and, therefore, 
their inclusion in the “white” race was only relevant, as a legal matter, to their ability to be 
naturalized as citizens of the United States. 
 36. In re Hassan, 48 F. Supp. 843 (E.D. Mich. 1942). 
 37. Bayoumi, supra note 16, at 99. 
 38. Based upon the author’s review of multiple racial prerequisite cases, including, but 
not limited to: cases cited herein, the case of U.S. v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204 (1923), the cases 
cited in Bayoumi’ s article Racing Religion and other similar scholarly works. 
 39. Hassan, 48 F. Supp. at 846. 
 40. Id. at 844. 
 41. Bayoumi, supra note 16, at 100. 
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comes, which [in] fact is attributed to the intense heat and the blazing sun 
of that area.”42 
The court ultimately rejected Mr. Hassan’s assertion that he was a 
“free white person” and denied his petition for naturalization.  However, the 
court did not base its denial upon either Mr. Hassan’s stated ancestry (as a 
remote descendant of the Caucasian or white race) or upon his physical 
appearance (including the “extremely dark complexion”).43  Instead, the 
court denied Mr. Hassan’s petition because he came from a region of the 
world where Islam was being practiced. The court specifically gave the 
following reason for its decision:  “Apart from the dark-skin of the Arabs, it 
is well-known that they are a part of the Mohammedan44 [sic] world and 
that a wide gulf separates their culture from that of the predominately 
Christian peoples of Europe.”45 
This language in Hassan raises several interesting points.  First, and 
most obviously, the court uses Mr. Hassan’s Muslim identity as a basis for 
defining his race as non-white.  Second, the court indicates that “Christian” 
identity is necessary to be considered a “free white person” person eligible 
for citizenship.  Third, and most intriguingly, the court seems to base its 
decision not on Mr. Hassan’s individual religious identity, but upon the 
majority religion in the region of the world from which Mr. Hassan 
emigrated.  This is an example of the racialization of Muslim identity—the 
notion that this particular religious identity applies to all persons who 
possess the same set of immutable characteristics, such as a shared 
ethnicity, regardless of any individual’s particular religious beliefs.  Indeed, 
the court’s language fails to identify whether Mr. Hassan, as an individual, 
identifies as “Muslim” or practices the Islamic faith.  Instead, the court only 
identifies Mr. Hassan as belonging to an ethnic group, “Arab,” which is 
associated with the Muslim-majority world.  Mr. Hassan is deemed non-
white because his ethnicity, an immutable characteristic, imparts upon him 
a Muslim identity.  Based upon this language, it would appear that the 
                                                                                                     
 42. In re Hassan, 48 F. Supp. 843, 845 (E.D. Mich. 1942). 
 43. Id. 
 44. The term “Mohammedan” is an archaic term and generally considered to be a 
pejorative term used to describe Muslims (i.e., practitioners of the Islamic faith).  The term 
is considered pejorative to Muslims who feel that it both misstates and misunderstands the 
Islamic religion, by suggesting that Muslims’ reverence for the Prophet Mohammed is akin 
to worship of a deity other than “the God of Abraham,” and attempts to distinguish the 
Islamic faith from other Abrahamic faith traditions.  Nonetheless, the term was commonly 
used during certain periods in United States history.  The term is contained herein in 
quotations from legal documents that were written during those time periods. 
 45. Hassan, 48 F. Supp. at 845. 
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judge construed Muslim identity in such a racialized manner that the 
religious beliefs and practices of Mr. Hassan were legally irrelevant. 
This question of whether a person’s individual religious beliefs affect 
his racial identity is commonly repeated in the racial prerequisite cases and 
produce conflicting results.  In the case of In re Ellis,46 a Syrian immigrant 
was allowed to obtain citizenship as a free white person because, as the 
court noted, “he was reared a Catholic and is still of that faith.”47  In another 
case involving a Syrian immigrant, Ex parte Shahid,48 the court denies the 
petitioner’s citizenship application on grounds other than the petitioner’s 
race, but articulates his discomfort with the notion that the definition of 
“free white persons” should exclude a consideration of religious identity.49  
Limiting the definition of “free white persons” solely to “Europeans,” the 
judge explained, that it would be troubling since such a definition “would 
exclude persons coming from the very cradle of the Jewish and Christian 
religions.”50  Though the judge in Shahid never clarified whether he 
believed that an individual’s religious beliefs or practices, or whether the 
relevant factor was the predominate religion in a petitioner’s country of 
origin, the judge nonetheless clearly opines that religion should be a 
consideration when legally defining an individual’s race. 
More interesting generally are the cases involving Armenian51 
immigrants during this time period.  For example, in United States v. 
Cartozian,52 a federal district court in Oregon granted an Armenian 
immigrant’s citizenship petition on the stated belief that Armenians, on 
account of their religion, could be defined as free white persons eligible for 
citizenship.53  Specifically, the court opined, “[a]lthough the Armenian 
province is within the confines of the Turkish empire, being in Asia Minor, 
the people thereof have always held themselves aloof from the Turks, the 
Kurds, and allied peoples, principally, it might be said, on account of their 
                                                                                                     
 46. In re Ellis, 179 F. 1002 (D. Or. 1910). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Ex parte Shahid, 205 F. 812 (E.D.S.C. 1913). 
 49. Bayoumi, supra note 16, at 105. 
 50. Shahid, 205 F. at 816. 
 51. See Armenia, WIKIPEDIA.ORG, (Oct. 11, 2013, 6:27 PM), http://en.wikipedia.org/ 
wiki/Armenia (noting the predominance of Christianity in Armenia, as well as providing 
general information about Armenia); see also Greater Middle East, WIKIPEDIA.ORG (Oct. 11, 
2013, 6:30 PM), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greater_Middle_East  (identifying Armenia as 
a part of the Greater Middle East). 
 52. United States v. Cartozian, 6 F.2d 919 (D. Or. 1925). 
 53. See Bayoumi, supra note 16, at 106 (briefly discussing Cartozian).  
IS BROWN THE NEW BLACK? 19 
religion.”54  In other words, Christianity makes the Armenians more 
culturally aligned with Europeans and this religious commonality makes the 
Armenians “white.”  In another naturalization case involving an Armenian 
petition, In re Halladjian,55 a federal district court sitting in Massachusetts 
opined: 
“Race . . . is not an easy working test of white color…. In the warfare 
which has raged since the beginning of history about the eastern 
Mediterranean between Europeans and Asiatics, the Armenians have 
generally. . . been found on the European side…. By reason of their 
Christianity, they generally ranged themselves against the Persian fire-
worshippers, and against the Mohammedans.”56 
As in Cartozian, the court in Halladijan once again concluded that 
Armenians, due to the historic Christianity of their nation, are culturally 
aligned with Europeans and, therefore, their collective historic Christianity 
makes them, as a people, “white.”  Once again, the court is unclear whether 
an individual’s religious identity is legally relevant but, once again, the 
court clearly articulates a racialized view that the historical majority 
religion of a people determines that group’s racial identity. 
This racialization of a religious identity is not unique to Muslims or to 
the United States.  Consider, for example, the discourse and dialogue that 
surrounds Jewish identity and the definition thereof.  Or, perhaps more 
appropriately, consider the way in which non-Jews have defined Jewish 
identity during certain periods of history.  Above, I referenced two 
interesting points raised by the first case I discuss in this subpart, In re 
Hassan.  However, the third point raised by the Hassan decision is, 
perhaps, the most intriguing.  The Hassan decision was entered in 1942.  
Now, let us think about what was happening in world history in 1942 and 
whether there was any other part of the world, outside of the United States, 
in which a federal government was determining “whiteness” (or inclusion 
in the “Aryan,” “European,” or “Caucasian” race) on the basis of religion?  
Right?  Now, keeping this concept of world history in mind, let’s actually 
think about the Third Reich for a moment.  Remember that Jewish identity 
was often determined by ancestry.  If you were born a Jew you were a Jew. 
You could try to convert your way out of it, you were still a Jew.  As noted 
by one scholar, “anti-Semitism became racism when the belief took hold 
that Jews were intrinsically and organically evil rather than merely having 
                                                                                                     
 54. Cartozian, 6 F.2d at 921. 
 55. In re Halladjian 174 F. 834 (C. C. D. Mass. 1909). 
 56. Id. at 840–41.  
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false beliefs and wrong dispositions.”57  In other words, religious bias 
predicated upon actual or perceived58 religious beliefs and practices is not 
racism, as a person is able avoid this bias by changing their religious beliefs 
and practices.  However, “religious” bias which relies upon a (stated, 
unstated, or even unconscious) belief that persons belonging to a certain 
religious group are “intrinsically and organically evil”—regardless of their 
religious beliefs or practices—is racism, and an individual cannot avoid this 
bias by converting to a different religion. 
V.  Where We’re Going: How Understanding the Racialization of American 
Muslim Identity May Affect the Criminalization of that Identity 
In Parts III and IV of this article, above, I have demonstrated that 
American Muslim identity has been criminalized, and I have demonstrated 
that American Muslim identity has been historically racialized—
specifically, as a non-white racial group.  Moreover, I have briefly 
discussed an almost undisputable reality of America’s racial history—that 
non-white persons, due to their racial identity, are presumed to have an 
inherent propensity for violence and criminality.  But have I answered the 
question of whether American Muslim identity, as one particular non-white 
racial identity, has been criminalized because it has been racialized?  Is this 
even possible to prove?  Moreover, why does it matter whether racialization 
is the driving force behind this criminalization? 
Now, in some ways it seems like it shouldn’t really matter whether the 
criminalization of American Muslim identity is based upon “race” or 
“religion.”  Because strict scrutiny applies either way—whether a 
government is discriminating on the basis of race, or on the basis of 
religion.  So, if the same level of scrutiny applies regardless of which claim 
is asserted, one could (wrongly) assume that the labeling of anti-Muslim 
profiling as “racial” profiling has no legal, political, or strategic relevance. 
                                                                                                     
 57. George M. Fredrickson, Racism: A Short History 19 (Princeton Univ. Press 2002).  
 58. I would qualify this “actual or perceived” language to assert that a bias predicated 
upon perceptions of religious beliefs and practices could still be classified as “racism” if 
those perceptions themselves assume an “intrinsic [ ] and organic [ ] evil.”  For example, 
consider the typical non-Muslim American’s understanding of the religious belief “jihad” 
and the perceptions of religious behaviors which accompany this religious belief.  If one 
assumes that a religious belief in “jihad” is synonymous violence and world domination, 
then that assumption may be based upon a belief that Muslims are “intrinsically and 
organically evil.” 
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However, the error in such an assumption is that the assumption itself 
ignores a certain psychosocial reality of American culture: Americans 
simply view racial discrimination as a more sinister, more egregious form 
of hate.  Therefore, I would posit to you that it does matter whether 
American Muslims are being criminalized as a “race” or as a result of their 
“religion.”  Because, as Americans, we do have an innate sense that 
discriminating against somebody for an immutable characteristic which 
they cannot change is just morally reprehensible.  Even more precisely, we 
have a racial history that causes us to believe that governmental 
discrimination on the basis of “race” is more socially deplorable than other 
forms of discrimination on other bases.  In contrast, discrimination based 
upon mutable characteristics, such as an individual’s beliefs (thoughts) or 
practices (actions) remains much more socially acceptable that 
discrimination based upon immutable characteristics such as race, ethnicity, 
and national origin. 
This socialized distinction between racial and religious discrimination 
has been incorporated into the language of certain governmental policies.  
For example, two of the FBI’s internal operating guidelines draw this very 
distinction.  Both the “Attorney General’s Guidelines for Domestic FBI 
Operations”59  and the “Guidance Regarding the Use of Race by Federal 
Law Enforcement Agencies,”60 prohibit the use of race, ethnicity, or 
national origin, as an ex ante basis for prediction criminality.  However, 
both guidelines, through their explicit silence on the matter, permit the use 
of religion (practices and beliefs) to determine and predict criminality.  
Such a distinction suggests a social awareness on the part of the FBI and an 
implicit acknowledgement that actions perceived as “racial profiling” are 
not well accepted by the American public—and may even suggest that the 
FBI itself, its decision-makers, share this cultural value.  Either way, the 
FBI’s distinction certainly appears as an attempt to reconcile official policy 
with American cultural values toward discrimination on the basis of “race.” 
If the FBI is ambivalent, or even uncertain, as to whether “Muslim” 
identity is and should be considered a “racial” identity, it is not alone.  
Following the symposium at which the research for this article was initially 
presented, scores of American lives were lost (or inalterably changed) 
                                                                                                     
 59. See Memorandum from Michael Mukasey, Attorney Gen., to the Heads of Dep’t 
Components 2 (Sept. 28, 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/ag/readingroom/ 
guidelines.pdf. 
 60. See Dep’t of Guidance Regarding Use of Race by Federal Law Enforcement 
Agencies (Jan. 2003), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/guidance 
_on_race.pdf.  
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during a terrorist attack on the City of Boston.61  As we know now, the 
perpetrators of that attack were American Muslims who had born in a 
Muslim-majority region in Caucasus mountains, immigrated to the United 
States lawfully, and who identified as American Muslims.  However, before 
the suspects had been publicly identified, a journalist published an article 
titled “Let’s Hope the Boston Marathon Bomber is a White American.”62 
The article drew sharp criticism and its author was accused of “playing the 
race card.”63  At the heart of this criticism was an implied suggestion that 
those who categorize the criminalization of American Muslim identity as 
the criminalization of a racial (as opposed to religious) identity are trying to 
play into American sympathies—our general disdain for racial profiling—
and are opportunistically using a dishonest labeling practice in order to do 
so.64  In response to this criticism, another author published an article,65 
which cited many of the cases cited herein, and asserted that the labeling of 
Muslim identity as a racial (or racialized) identity is not dishonest and is 
consistent with the historic racialization of American Muslim identity.  
Moreover, the response article cited specific case law in support of its 
thesis, thereby demonstrating that American Muslim identity has legally 
been defined as a racial category consistently throughout the history of the 
United States.  This citation of legal precedent gives enhanced credence to 
the prior author’s analysis of the laws and policies which have been 
applied, almost exclusively, to American Muslim identity in the post-9/11 
era. 
Moving forward, as we think about how to effectively argue on behalf 
of American Muslim civil rights, these two articles—written by columnists, 
                                                                                                     
 61. See Boston Marathon bombings, WIKIPEDIA.ORG, (Oct. 11, 2013, 7:03 PM), 
www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boston_Marathon_bombings (describing bombs that exploded 
at the April 15, 2013 Boston Marathon, “killing 3 people and injuring an estimated 264 
others”). 
 62.  David Sirota, Let’s hope the Boston Marathon bomber is a white American, SALON 
(Oct. 11, 2013, 10:58 PM), http://www.salon.com/2013/04/16/lets_hope_the_boston 
_marathon_bomber_is_a_white_american/.  
 63. See Greg Pollowitz, David Sirota, Salon, and White Privilege, NAT’L REV. ONLINE 
MEDIA BLOG (Oct. 11, 2013, 7:48 PM), http://www.nationalreview.com/media-
blog/345855/david-sirota-salon-and-white-privilege. 
 64. Id. (noting that the article does display a more nuanced understanding of “Muslim” 
as a racial, or racialized, group identity and distinguished between what Sirota calls “white 
non-Islamic terrorists” and “non-white or developing-world terroris[ts]”). 
 65. See Peter Beinart, Are the Tsarnaevs White?, THE DAILY BEAST (Apr. 24, 2013), 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/04/24/are-the-tsarnaevs-white.html) (last visited 
Oct. 11, 2013) (implying that those who identity the Boston Marathon bombing as a 
racialized criminalization are attempting to play into American sympathies).  
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not lawyers—are somewhat instructive.  Many organizations which 
advocate for American Muslim civil rights, much like the first author, 
boldly assert that the criminalization of American Muslim identity is a form 
of “racial profiling” and that all anti-Muslim bias is racial bias—without 
providing any data or research to support this assertion.  As reaction to the 
“Let’s Hope the Boston Marathon Bombers Are White” article 
demonstrates, this strategy is ineffective if it contains no data or research to 
support the assertion.  For example, when attorneys have made this same 
unsupported assertion in legal proceedings, they have been unsuccessful.66  
A more effective strategy would follow the example of the second author 
who wrote the “Are the Tsarnaevs White?” article.  I would still encourage 
advocates for American Muslim legal equality to argue the impropriety of 
using Muslim identity as an ex ante basis for determining criminal 
suspicion.  However, and this is important, I would assert that it is an 
ineffective strategy to simply label the criminalization of Muslim identity as 
a form of racial profiling and to assume that your target audience agrees 
that this label is accurate and appropriate.  Instead, I would argue that we 
will need to justify our use of this label in every instance in which we use 
the label.  Only then can we change the way in which our target audiences 
are able to see the criminalization of American Muslim identity (i.e., the 
presumption of an inherent propensity for violence and criminality) in the 
proper light. 
Thank you for your time, everybody. 
  
                                                                                                     
 66. Abdallah v. Allegheny Valley Sch., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10667 (E.D. Pa. 2011) 
(denying plaintiff’s assertion that his Muslim identity was a racial identity and reasoning 
that: “While a court will accept well-pled allegations as true for the purposes of the motion, 
it will not accept bald assertions, unsupported conclusions, unwarranted inferences, or 
sweeping legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations” (citing Morse v. Lower 
Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997))) (emphasis added). 
